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Abstract 
This paper analyzes local public fiscal and spending behavior in a setting where local governments, 
represented by the dominant party or coalition, are treated as utility maximizing agents. The 
econometric analysis, which is based on a modified version of ELES, recognizes total spending as 
well as total income as endogenous variables. Identification of the price effects is achieved by utilizing 
data on environmental cost factors and local tastes. The performance of the estimated model is 
investigated by testing its ability to make out-of-sample predictions of local government behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
Previous local public finance and expenditure studies have either focused on the trade-off between 
locally imposed taxes and total local public spending, or on the allocation of total expenditures on 
various service sectors when total expenditures are considered to be exogenous. The present study 
aims at analyzing local public fiscal and spending behavior in a simultaneous setting. Our modeling 
approach differs from the widely used median voter model by considering the local government, 
represented by the dominant political party or a coalition of parties, rather than the median voter as the 
decision-making unit.1 From the local government's viewpoint, the decision problem consists of 
choosing the best combination of locally imposed taxes, budget surplus or deficit, and output in public 
services subject to the constraint that local government spending plus budget surplus cannot exceed 
grants from the central government plus local taxes. As suggested by Johnson (1979) a major 
advantage of this modeling approach is that it allows different impacts of central government grants 
and residential income on the fiscal and spending policy of the local government. There appears to be 
strong empirical evidence in support of greater impact on local public spending from an increase in 
grants than from an equivalent increase in residential income. This regularity was called the "flypaper 
effect" by Gramlich and Galper (1973). Although the median voter models can be modified to account 
for flypaper effects, it appears rather artificial to allow for different tax and spending responses of 
grants-in-aid and residential income when the median voter is considered to be the decision-maker.2 
Furthermore, as applied to disaggregated analysis of spending, the median voter approach imposes 
rather curious restrictions on voter preferences.3 
 The purpose of this paper is to make a contribution to the understanding of the variety in fiscal 
and spending behavior of local governments in cases where prices on local public services are not 
observed, but where we instead have extensive and detailed information of community characteristics 
that may capture variation in costs and capacity to produce local public services. Thus, in our case the 
informational basis is characterized by rich and detailed information for each of relatively few units 
(426 municipalities). Moreover, since price data is absent the alternative cost related information 
suggests the use of a strict functional form model. The strict functional form can be somewhat relaxed 
by allowing the parameters of the model to depend on demographic variables and other community 
characteristics. 
 The empirical analysis of this paper is based on an application of a Stone-Geary utility 
function where the local government, represented by the dominant party or coalition, is assumed to 
have preferences over user fees (local taxes), budget surplus and output on eight service sectors, where 
                                                     
1 For a discussion of alternative expenditure decision models we refer to Inman (1979), Bahl et al. (1980) and Wildasin 
(1986). 
2 For a further discussion we refer to Johnson (1979). 
3 See Riker and Ordeshook (1973), Kramer (1973) and Romer and Rosenthal (1979). 
 2
user fees are treated as a negative good. The derived demand system differs from the extended linear 
expenditure system (ELES) by treating total income as well as total spending as endogenous variables, 
and by allowing the present value of changes in future exogenous incomes to differ from zero. The 
latter property justifies the presence of budget deficits among local governments. The estimation of the 
demand system is based on the local government accounts and community characteristics for 1993. 
These data do not include information on prices. However, we achieve identification of the complete 
demand system by accounting for heterogeneity in environmental cost factors and the marginal 
propensities to charge fees, to spend and to save. Allowing for heterogeneity in the parameters of the 
demand system makes also the Engel curves more flexible, and thus to a certain extent accommodates 
the conventional criticism against the LES and the ELES. 
 Our modeling approach permits the income and price elasticities to depend on variables that 
reflect differences in costs of providing minimum required service standards, as well as in taste 
patterns across local governments. Thus, we provide a detailed analysis of the expenditure effects of 
various community characteristics and of the fiscal and spending responses of local governments from 
an increase in exogenous income or prices. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to a discussion of the institutional 
constraints that local governments face in Norway and to a description of the theoretical framework. 
Section 3 deals with the empirical specification of the model. Section 4 reports the estimated 
parameters and elasticities. Results from out-of-sample predictions are displayed and discussed in 
Section 5. A brief summary and conclusion is given in Section 6. 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. The choice environment of local governments in Norway 
In Norway local governments face balanced budget rules, income tax rules and other institutional 
constraints introduced by the central government. The constraints set by the central government have a 
significant impact on the choice environment of local governments including the budget constraint. 
Thus, information on the choice environment helps to clarify the definition of endogenous and 
exogenous variables in our modeling framework. The budget constraint is defined by 
(2.1)  y v u p q
i
s
i i+ = +
=
0
1
,
where y is exogenous income, v is user fees, u0 is budget surplus, and pi and qi are price and quantity 
in service sector i. 
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 The major part of local government income is general grants-in-aid from the central 
government and local income and property taxes. These incomes define the exogenous income y.4 
Grants-in-aid are mainly of a revenue-sharing or lump-sum type. Since matching grants only constitute 
a minor part of the total grants, we treat all grants as exogenous. The grant program is financed by a 
national income tax which is collected by the central government. Local income and property taxes 
can be treated as exogenous variables since tax bases as well as tax rates are in general determined by 
the central government.5 
 There is, however, one important supplementary revenue resource to the centralized system of 
financing. Local governments have wide discretion to charge user fees in payment for services 
received by residents. Following Borge (1995), we assume that user fees are fiscally motivated. Their 
purpose is to raise revenue in order to finance the production of local public services. Consequently, 
fee income (v) is the major local tax instrument in our model, while all other sources of income are 
treated as exogenous. In 1993 user fees on average accounted for 14.4 per cent of total local 
government incomes, and the standard deviation was 3.4 per cent. Minimum and maximum was 6.0 
and 25.4 per cent, respectively. 
 User charges in some services like kindergartens are set by local governments. Other services 
like primary schools are free of charge. Infrastructure services can be charged provided that charges do 
not exceed the costs of providing the services. However, this regulation is rather vague due to 
measurement and control problems and can be considered as a soft constraint. 
 Beyond the centralized system of financing, local governments also meet an extensive set of 
regulations and legal constraints. For example, the Local Government Act makes provisions against 
budget deficits. Although local governments face a balanced budget rule, budget deficits are regularly 
observed in the accounts. Thus, this is a case of a soft constraint. For this reason, the surplus is treated 
as endogenous in the analysis. However, although the budget rule does not work as an effective limit 
on current spending, it may still to some extent act to restrain borrowing and prevent long-term budget 
deficits. 
 A prevalent feature of local government in Norway is the freedom to make priorities over local 
public service production. Local governments can undertake whatever task they find desirable, and 
allocate resources as they like. But even this freedom is not totally unlimited. Different client groups 
have statutory rights to receive certain services for which local governments are given the 
responsibility. For example, the primary education for children 7-15 years of age is obligatory, the 
poor have a right to receive social benefits, and the elderly and disabled are entitled to be taken care 
                                                     
4 Net interest and installment payments are subtracted in the definition of exogenous income. 
5 Local governments may to some extent increase their tax bases by funding business development. Yet, such expenditures 
constitute only a minor component in local government budgets. Furthermore, since central government grants depend 
negatively on local government tax incomes, the impact on total incomes is probably limited.  
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of. It is the duty of local governments to meet these and a few other obligations given by the central 
government. 
 Not only types of services, but also service levels are affected by central government 
regulations. Local governments face national standards of maximum class sizes and maximum 
traveling distance to school for pupils in primary schools. The aim of these and other regulations is to 
ensure a minimum required size and quality of local public services across municipalities. Although 
the minimum standards are not specified in monetary terms, they certainly affect local government 
expenditures. For instance, the national norm of maximum traveling distance to school increases 
education expenditures in sparsely populated areas. However, assuming that local government 
incomes (y + v) exceed costs to meet central government regulations and minimum standards, it 
follows that the budget allocation on service sectors is subject to local government choices. 
2.2. Prices and output 
The budget constraint (2.1) introduces a division between prices and quantities in local public service 
production. We will now derive a concept of prices and quantities that is based on observable 
heterogeneity in the cost functions. One advantage of this approach is that effects of national service 
standards and other regulations can be integrated in the model. 
 The lack of adequate measures for public output is a major problem in the analysis of demand 
for public services. Using expenditure as a proxy for output, which relies on the assumption of 
constant prices, is obviously in conflict with reality. Alternatively, we may use the standard tax price 
which is defined to be equal to the median voter’s tax share multiplied by the unit cost of each service. 
6 This approach is, however, based on controversial assumptions. For instance, it is assumed that the 
median voter receives the median income. Moreover, the median voter's share is not appropriate as 
basis for the definition of prices when the local government rather than the median voter is treated as 
the decision-making unit. In this case it is useful to base the discussion of price effects on measures of 
unit costs in local public production. 
 Unit costs for public services are usually derived from factor input prices.7 In the public 
employment approach developed by Ehrenberg (1973) and Bahl et al. (1980), employment is used as a 
proxy for output in a Leontief fixed-factor relation where non-labor expenditure is assumed constant 
per unit of employment.8 Unit cost measures can thus be derived from wage data. However, this 
approach is not without drawbacks. First, Bradford, Malt and Oates (1969) draw a distinction between 
the output produced directly by the public sector (termed "D-output") and the output that is of primary 
concern to the citizen-consumer (termed "C-output"). D-output is a function of purchased inputs; C-
                                                     
6 See Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). 
7 See Borcherding and Deacon (1972), Ehrenberg (1973), Bahl et al. (1980), Schwab and Zampelli (1987), and Borge and 
Rattsø (1995). 
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output is a function of D-output and the community environment. Even if the median voter is not 
assumed to be decisive, it does not follow that the local government is not at all concerned about C-
output. Yet, the employment proxy is exclusively a measure of D-output. Second, the public 
employment approach implicitly assumes that labor is homogenous within each service producing 
sector. However, most public services employ workers with different skills and professional 
qualifications. For instance, one has to assume that physicians, nurses and clerical assistants in public 
health care are equally productive. Thus, it is not recognized that wage cost differentials may reflect 
variations in labor productivity. When labor within a service is heterogeneous, it becomes less 
plausible to assume a Leontief fixed-factor technology. Third, when average wage rates are used as 
price variables, it may introduce simultaneity biases in the econometric model. In Norway, wages for 
different professions employed by local governments are mainly set in a bargaining process at the 
national level. However, due to local variations in community environment, local governments may 
choose different production techniques to meet local demands. Therefore, by the choice of production 
technique and combination of different types of labor, the average wage rate is endogenous in the local 
government decision process. The price variable is endogenous because inputs are in fact 
substitutable. 
 In this paper we adopt an indirect method for identifying price elasticities. Let the production 
function for service sector i be given by 
(2.2)  q f ii i i i= =( , ), , , ...,x z 1 2 s
                                                                                                                                                                     
where xi is a vector of factor inputs and zi is a vector of community characteristics that affect 
production opportunities. Assuming constant returns to scale and cost minimization, the derived cost 
function is given by 
(2.3) , C q p qi i i i i i i i( , , ) ( , )w z w z=
where wi is a vector of factor prices and pi is unit cost in sector i. Since wage rates in the public sector 
in Norway are set in a centralized system of bargaining, it seems plausible to assume that wage rates 
do not vary across municipalities. The more conventional assumption of constant prices on material 
inputs may derive from competition within a national factor market. Thus, it appears likely that 
variation in unit costs across municipalities solely is due to variation in local production opportunities 
which can be captured by relevant community characteristics.9 
 
8 The public employment approach has been used by Rattsø (1989) and Borge and Rattsø (1995) for analyzing Norwegian 
data. 
9 In the case of publicly provided goods the hedonic method is not appropriate, since it derives implicit prices in the setting 
of competitive markets, see Rosen (1974). However, our approach is similar to the hedonic method in the sense that unit 
costs are specified as functions of observable characteristics. 
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2.3. Constrained maximization by the dominant party or coalition 
This paper treats local governments as utility maximizing agents when they determine the levels of 
expenditures on various services as well as the level of user fees and budget deficits to finance these 
expenditures. The decision-making unit is a dominant political party or a coalition of parties. Local 
government decisions are assumed to be made on a per capita basis. As Inman (1971), Ehrenberg 
(1973) and Johnson (1979) we use a Stone-Geary specification of the utility function. However, as 
opposed to their approach we allow for budget surpluses and deficits and follow Johnson (1979) by 
treating local taxes (user fees) as an endogenous variable.10 Thus, local governments are assumed to have 
preferences over user fees (v), budget surplus (u0) and levels of output (  on s service 
sectors which means that the decision-making unit faces an intertemporal utility maximization problem.
)q q qs1 2, , ...,
11 
By treating total expenditures in the linear expenditure system (LES) as an endogenous variable, Lluch 
(1973) developed ELES to deal with consumption and savings behavior within a given period of time, 
and demonstrated that this expenditure system can be given an intertemporal interpretation. Howe (1975) 
provided an alternative justification of ELES based on an atemporal maximization of a Stone-Geary 
utility function. In Howe's approach savings is treated as a commodity with zero "subsistence quantity". 
We abolish this constraint and allow for variation in committed savings. Moreover, as opposed to the 
standard version of ELES we treat total income as well as total spending as endogenous variables. Thus, 
the utility function is assumed to have the following structure 
(2.4)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )W v u q q q v u qs
i
s
i i
i, , , , ... ,0 1 2 0 0
1
0
= − − −
=
∏κ αθ β βγ
where 
(2.5)  θ β+ =
=

i
s
i
0
1,
and 0 1 0 1 0 0≤ ≤ ∀ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≥β θ γ α κi i ii q u and, , , v.
                                                     
 
 The utility function (2.4) of the local government decision-making unit increases in 
 and u0, and decreases in v due to the implied reduction in the disposable income of 
residents. 
q q qs1 2, , ... ,
 Maximizing (2.4) subject to (2.5) and the budget constraint (2.1) yield the following version of 
the extended linear expenditure system (ELES) 
10 User fees is the major local tax instrument available to municipalities in Norway. 
11 The net operating surplus is defined as current income plus user fees minus current expenditures minus compulsory 
installment and interest payments. 
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(2.6)  
p q p y p i s
u y p
v y p
i i i i i
j
j j
j
j j
j
j j
= + + − −





 =
= + + − −






= − + − −









γ β κ α γ
α β κ α γ
κ θ κ α γ
0
0 0 0 0
0
1 2, , , ...,
.
The γ-parameters are conventionally interpreted as "subsistence" or minimum acceptable quantities of 
each of the local public services, and α0 as the minimum acceptable level of savings (fiscal surplus). 
Similarly as Johnson (1979) we interpret κ as the maximum acceptable level of local taxes (user fees). 
Moreover, y j j+ − − pκ α γ0  represents discretionary income which is distributed between the 
private and the local public sectors in line with the marginal shared parameter θ. The local public share 
 of the discretionary income is distributed among the local public services including fiscal 
surplus in proportion to the parameters 
( )1 − θ
( )β θi i1 0 1− =, , , ... , s .  Note that ( )[ ]
i
s
i
=
 − =
0
1 1β θ .  
 Although we have used an atemporal framework in deriving the ELES version defined by 
(2.6) it can, as for the standard ELES, be given an intertemporal interpretation. The standard ELES 
assumes that exogenous income is constant over time which is equivalent to the assumption of zero 
committed savings in the atemporal version of ELES. Our modified version of ELES includes an 
additional parameter (  that captures the presence of committed savings. In the intertemporal 
setting the parameter α0 can be interpreted as the present value of changes in future exogenous 
incomes which means that exogenous income is allowed to vary over time. Thus our modified version 
of ELES may justify the presence of deficit financing.
)α 0
12 
3. Specification and estimation of the model 
3.1. Heterogeneity in cost and taste parameters 
The estimation of (2.6) requires information on price variation for all local public services. Our data 
do not include direct information on prices. Thus, it is convenient to use the expenditure version of 
(2.6), 
(3.1) 
),y(v
s,...,2,1,0i),y(u iii
α−κ+θ−κ=
=α−κ+β+α=
 
                                                     
12 To allow for deficit financing, we assume that local governments at a given point in time face the same exogenous interest 
rate in a competitive loan market. 
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where  is expenditure on service sector i ( , αu p qi i= i )i ≠ 0 γi ip=
− =0
i
,
 is subsistence requirement or 
minimum required expenditure on service sector i  and α α  is the minimum 
required expenditure on all local public services. 
( )i ≠ 0 α
=

1i
s
i
 Similarly as standard LES the system (3.1) is not fully identified when price information is not 
available. The standard way of achieving identification is to introduce one additional restriction, for 
example by setting one of the αi's equal to zero. This approach is used to establish the standard ELES. 
This practice suffers, however, from lack of convincing theoretical arguments. An alternative strategy 
is to allow for heterogeneity in the parameters and impose an identifying functional form on the 
parameter-heterogeneity. Pollak and Wales (1978) have described this procedure as "translating" the 
demand system. This approach appears particularly attractive since differences in fiscal and spending 
behavior across local governments may arise from differences in costs to attain minimum standards on 
various services, as well as from different taste patterns. 
 Let z  be r variables that are assumed to affect the sector-specific subsistence 
expenditures, the minimum acceptable fiscal surplus and the maximum acceptable level of user fees. 
Similarly, let t  be m variables that are assumed to capture variation in preferences with 
regard to allocation of the discretionary income. Specifically, we postulate a linear functional form 
z z r1 2, , ... ,
t t m1 2, , ...,
(3.2)  
jj
r
1j
0
jij
r
1j
0ii
z
s,...,1,0i,z
κ+κ=κ
=α+α=α


=
=
and 
(3.3)  
β β β
θ θ θ
i i
j
m
ij j
j
m
j j
t i s
t
= + =
= +
=
=


0
1
0
1
0 1, , , ...
.
Furthermore, by imposing the following restrictions on the parameters in (3.3) 
(3.4)  
θ β
θ β
j
i
s
ij
i
s
i
j m+ = =
+ =
=
=


0
0
0
0
0 1 2
1
, , , ...,
,
the adding-up constraint (2.5) is fulfilled. 
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 It follows from equations (3.1)-(3.4) that the demand system is completely identified provided 
that the two sets of heterogeneity variables (z and t) do not coincide. 
 In order to estimate the demand system defined by (3.1)-(3.4) we have to specify the variables 
(z) that are expected to capture the heterogeneity in the subsistence expenditures, minimum acceptable 
budget surplus and maximum acceptable level of user fees. Moreover, we have to specify variables 
that describe heterogeneity (t) in preferences for allocation of discretionary income. Obviously, the 
selection of z and t has to depend on characteristics of the choice environment with particular 
reference to the impact of central government regulations.  
 Analyses of public expenditures typically assume that socioeconomic and demographic variables 
capture variations in tastes for local public services. 13 Schwab and Zampelli (1987) argue that not only 
tastes, but also the production process is likely to vary across municipalities. They demonstrate that failure 
to incorporate community characteristics in production and cost functions can yield misleading results. 
This means that there are two sources that can justify the selection of explanatory variables. Heterogeneity 
in the model parameters can either derive from heterogeneous preferences or from heterogeneous 
production costs. 
 In order to disentangle the two types of heterogeneity, it is convenient to exploit the traditional 
interpretations of the ELES parameters. As already mentioned, the parameters αi are associated 
with unit costs and minimum standard requirements. Unit costs may vary either because of different 
production technologies or different factor prices. In the case of local public services, minimum 
requirements and other regulations are given by the central government. In our framework the 
subsistence quantities are considered as minimum standards for public services reflecting national 
regulations or norms developed jointly by the municipalities. Consequently, the α-parameters are 
assumed to depend solely on production technology and cost structure. By contrast, the allocation of 
discretionary spending, the θ and β-parameters, are assumed to vary with local taste. Thus, the 
marginal budget share parameters depend on taste variables. 
( )i ≠ 0
 The assumption that taste variables affect marginal budget shares but not subsistence 
expenditures enables us to identify the complete demand system. The achievement of identification 
does not require all variables in z and t to be mutually exclusive. However, this structure agrees well 
with conventional interpretations of the ELES model. 
3.2. Minimum fiscal surplus and maximum acceptable fee income 
Lluch (1973) and Howe (1975) implicitly assume that α  is equal to zero. A critique against the 
atemporal ELES version of Howe is that savings must be non-negative to be consistent with utility 
maximization (see Lluch, Powell and Williams, 1977). This is a rather implausible constraint. 
0
                                                     
13 See Inman (1979) and Bahl et al. (1980) for discussions of the expenditure determinants studies. 
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However, by including the parameter , it is only required that savings must exceed the minimum 
savings parameter, which can be negative. Another advantage is, as suggested by equation (3.2), that 
the minimum savings parameter may be allowed to vary across municipalities. 
α0
)0=
00
 The Local Government Act contains a balanced budget rule that prohibits local governments 
to plan for persistent deficits. However, the budget rule does not exclude adjustments to variations in 
annual incomes, which may result in temporary deficits. Indeed, budget deficits are regularly observed 
in the local government accounts. Local governments may adjust the fiscal surplus as a response to 
income fluctuations over time. This is done in order to attain a smoother time path of expenditures, so 
that local government activities are protected from casual income fluctuations. The budget surplus is 
used as a buffer device that absorbs parts of the short-term economic fluctuations and may justify the 
following structure in minimum fiscal surplus, 
(3.5)  α α α0 00 01= + Δy
where  is the change in real exogenous income from the previous year. Since  is equal to the 
present value of changes in future exogenous income it follows that  can be interpreted as 
permanent exogenous income. The constant term  is assumed to capture the present value of a 
long-term growth trend in exogenous income. Historical figures suggest that there is a positive growth 
trend in exogenous income for local governments in Norway. For positive growth trend and no change 
in current income ( , permanent income is higher than current income. When 
permanent income is higher than current income, local governments may want to accelerate current 
spending by deficit financing. However, the balanced budget rule imposed by the central government 
may be seen as an attempt to restrict α  downwards, or more specifically, that the parameter should 
be non-negative.  
Δy −α 0
y − α 0
( )−α 00
α 00 0< and yΔ
 Local governments are allowed to smooth out income fluctuations, as long as they do not 
operate with a structural, or persistent deficit. The parameter α01 in the specification (3.5) of α0 is 
assumed to capture adjustments to short-term fluctuations in exogenous income. When Δy is large and 
α01 is positive, the local government expects lower increases in future exogenous incomes. By 
contrast, a small positive or negative Δy may justify a temporary budget deficit since local 
governments then expect higher future incomes. 
 The results reported by Borge (1995) suggest that fee income increases with increasing 
exogenous municipal income. At first glance this result may seem inconsistent with our model. 
However, local governments may not have a strong inclination to reduce user charges, since user 
charges are not allowed to exceed the unit costs in service provision. An exogenous income increase 
gives local governments the opportunity to supply larger quantities without increasing user charges. 
Even if user charges per unit are reduced, the volume increase may counteract such reductions, such 
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that total fee income increases. This mechanism is incorporated in our model by allowing the 
maximum acceptable fee income to increase with the level of exogenous income,14 
(3.6) κ κ κ α α= + − −0 1 2 5( )y , 
where  are subsistence expenditures in education and  are subsistence expenditures in social 
services. Subsistence expenditures in education and social services are subtracted since such services 
are provided free of user charges. When 
α2 α5
κ1 0> , equations (3.1) and (3.6) show that a change in 
exogenous income y affects the fee income v in two different ways. Since user fees is a negative good, 
exogenous income has a direct negative effect on user fees. However, this negative effect is 
counteracted by a positive indirect effect which acts through the maximum acceptable fee income. The 
total effect may be positive, zero or negative. 
 The above discussion concerns variables that are assumed to capture heterogeneity in the 
subsistence expenditures, the minimum acceptable fiscal surplus and the maximum acceptable level of 
user fees. As suggested above there may also be heterogeneity in preferences for allocation of 
discretionary income. Politics at the local level is characterized by representative democracy and a 
multi-party system in which the division between socialist and non-socialist parties is regarded as a 
major cleavage. Thus, priorities are affected by the party composition of the municipal council. For a 
given party composition, priorities may depend on political strength and party concentration in the 
council. The reelection constraint may also induce politicians to be sensitive to popular tastes and 
attitudes towards local public services in the electorate. We assume that such tastes vary across 
subgroups of the population, as a function of socioeconomic status. Education level and private 
disposable income are used as indicators of social composition of the population. We assume that 
party priorities are partly ideological and partly adjusted towards the tastes of dominating 
socioeconomic groups. 
3.3. The flypaper effect 
User fees is the major tax instrument that local governments can use to reallocate resources between 
the private and the local public sector. In analyses where the local decision-maker is treated as a 
median voter with full discretion to allocate disposable local resources over private and public goods, 
it is concluded that the response to a lump-sum income increase should be independent of whether the 
income increase is received by the private or the local public sector.15 For instance, if the central 
government pays more grants-in-aid to the local government, or if the same amount is distributed 
directly to local residents as tax reductions, the allocation outcome should be exactly the same. 
However, empirical evidence suggests that money given to the private sector tends to stick to the 
                                                     
14 This formulation departs slightly from Johnson (1979), where the maximum acceptable level of local taxes depends on 
private disposable income. 
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private sector, and is not taxed away, whilst grants-in-aid to the local government tends to stick in the 
public sector and get spent there. An increase in grants to the local government is more stimulative on 
local government expenditures than an equivalent increase in private incomes. This phenomenon is 
called the flypaper effect, since money sticks where it hits.16 
 In our model, the disposable income of local residents is not included in the budget constraint 
of the local government. We assume that the private and public sector mix is primarily settled in the 
political process at the national level. Due to the centralized system of financing, local governments 
have only a limited scope for adjustments by collecting user charges. Most user charges are bounded 
not to exceed unit costs, so there are limited opportunities for local governments to control private 
consumption. Therefore, private disposable income does not enter the model through the budget 
constraint, but only as a taste variable in line with the education level and the party composition of the 
local council. Moreover, the revenue-sharing money granted to local governments is accompanied by 
implicit contracts to provide certain goods by the public sector. Consequently, the flypaper effect 
cannot be considered as an anomaly in our model. Since the scope for local reallocations between the 
private and public sector is considerably restricted by central regulations, appearance of a flypaper 
effect seems rather plausible. 
4. Estimation results 
Our empirical model specification relies on the sector classification that forms the basis of the local 
government accounts in Norway. This classification, which reflects central regulations and sector-
specific minimum required standards as well as priorities of local governments, is defined by the 
following eight service sectors: 
1. Administration 
2. Education 
3. Child care 
4. Health care 
5. Social services 
6. Care for the elderly and disabled 
7. Culture 
8. Infrastructure 
These eight expenditure categories together with the budget surplus and the fee income define the 
endogenous variables in our model. The budget surplus and the fee income are denoted sectors 0 and 
9, respectively. Summary statistics are reported in Table 4.1. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
15 See e.g. Bradford and Oates (1971). 
16 A survey of the literature on flypaper effects is given by Hines et al. (1995). 
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Table 4.1. Summary statistics of budget surplus, user fees and eight expenditure groups for 
 municipalities in Norway in 1993. 1000 NOK per capita 
Sector   0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Mean 0.87 2.16 5.72 1.67 1.26 1.16 6.49 1.25 3.85 3.41
Minimum -3.59 0.75 3.54 0.35 0.45 0.14 0.37 0.37 0.29 1.52
Maximum 25.33 7.86 14.92 5.78 5.56 3.29 17.51 4.01 16.62 8.00
Standard deviation 1.92 1.09 1.37 0.74 0.71 0.51 2.08 0.52 1.77 0.89
 
Table 4.1 demonstrates that mean per capita expenditure is largest in sector 6 (care for the elderly and 
disabled), followed by sector 2 (education), sector 8 (infrastructure) and sector 1 (administration). 
Moreover, it appears to be large variation in sector-specific per capita expenditures across 
municipalities as well as in per capita budget surplus and fee income. 
 The model (3.1)-(3.6) was estimated on a per capita basis by the maximum likelihood method 
where the error terms were assumed to have a multinormal distribution with mean 0 and unrestricted 
covariance matrix. The estimates rely on detailed local government accounts and community 
characteristics for 426 municipalities in 1993. We find the estimated parameters to be generally 
significant and to have the expected signs. Estimation results for the ELES model are reported in 
Sections 4.1 - 4.3. Previous empirical analyses of Norwegian local governments' fiscal and spending 
behavior have been restricted to focus on either the allocation of a fixed income on different services 
or on the financing of local public spending. We refer to Borge et al. (1995) for an analysis of the 
former problem. 
4.1. Heterogeneity in subsistence expenditures, minimum required fiscal surplus  and 
 maximum acceptable user fees 
Due to their soft nature the central government regulations are not suitable for being directly 
integrated in the model. However, these regulations ought to be reflected in the selection of 
determinants of local government expenditure variations. Specifically, the sector-specific subsistence 
spending, the minimum fiscal surplus and the maximum acceptable user fees are assumed to depend 
on the central government regulations. 
 Services like education, child care, social services and care for the elderly and disabled are 
targeted towards specific age-groups or socio-demographic subgroups of the population.  
Consequently, demographic variables are one important group of factors explaining variations in 
subsistence expenditures.17 Subsistence expenditures are also assumed to vary with the settlement 
                                                     
17 Population and age structure is treated as exogenous in the model. This condition could be violated if citizens were mobile 
and show a tendency to "vote by their feet", see Tiebout (1956). In that case migration would be affected by service levels in 
different municipalities. However, since migration rates in Norway are quite low, such a role for the demand side is not 
included in the model. The share of the population that moved across municipality borders in 1993 was 3.9 per cent. 
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pattern within the municipality, scale properties, climatic conditions and sewage purification 
regulations. The precise definitions of these variables are given in Table 4.2, which also reports 
corresponding estimates and t-values for the parameter heterogeneity as specified in equation (3.2). 
The effects of the age structure of the residents on the subsistence expenditure allocation conform well 
to theoretical reasoning. Children in pre-school age raise child care expenditures, and children in 
school age raise education expenditures. We also find a positive, but weakly significant effect of pre-
school children on health care expenditures. The results show a significant effect in health care for 
those in the age group 80 years and above. The estimated coefficient for the elderly below 80 years is 
insignificant for health care services, but elderly 67-89 years of age increase expenditures in care for 
the elderly and disabled. Moreover, it is found that elderly 90 years and above of age have a 
significant impact on expenditures in care for the elderly and disabled that is substantially higher than 
for elderly below 90 years of age. 
 For explanatory variables on a per capita form, the corresponding coefficients can be 
interpreted as effects of partial marginal changes. Thus, the partial effect of one more child 0-6 years 
of age is found to increase child care expenditures by 8.170 NOK. If the child is supported by a single 
adult, the expenditure increases by an additional amount of 13.660 NOK. Children also increase costs 
in health care, but this effect is only weakly significant. When the population increases by one person 
in the age group 7-15 years, the education expenditure increases by 27.850 NOK. If this person is 
mentally disabled there are additional costs that amount to 216.530 NOK. By contrast, one additional 
mentally disabled person aged 16 years or more increases expenditures by 363.780 NOK in care for 
the disabled. 
 The marginal impact of elderly 80 years and above equals 7.950 NOK in health services. In 
care for the elderly and disabled, one more person in the age groups 67-89 years and 90 years and 
above increases expenditures on average by 14.270 NOK and 150.840 NOK, respectively. Mentally 
disabled children were, however, neither found to have a significant effect on expenditures in care for 
the elderly and disabled nor in child care services. This result suggests that local governments on 
average devote more resources to adults than to children with mental disablement. Thus, it seems that 
local governments reduce their costs by limiting the relief to parents with mentally disabled children. 
Such cost savings can also induce increases in national insurance benefits to the parents. Therefore, 
national insurance regulations may in effect weaken incentives to assist the parents. 
 Larger occurrence of foreign citizens with remote cultural background, and unemployed, 
divorced and separated persons are found to significantly increase expenditures in social services. The 
estimates of marginal increases in expenditures for these groups are in the range of 12.000 to 15.000 
NOK per person. These effects are due to the relatively high propensities for unemployed, divorced 
and immigrants to receive social benefits and other social services. 
 Education expenditures decrease with population density and increase with average traveling 
time to the municipal centre. Such cost increases are due to a decentralized school structure with small 
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classes in sparsely populated areas. The demand for accessibility also implies higher health care 
expenditures when average traveling time increases. One hour increase in average traveling time 
increases expenditures by 1.190 NOK per capita in the education sector and by 490 NOK per capita in 
health care services. 
 The estimation results indicate that health care expenditures depend positively on the 
population density of the municipality. The explanation may be that ill-health frequencies are higher in 
densely populated areas due to higher exposure to air pollution and unhealthy life style. The 
estimation shows that culture expenditures also tend to increase with population density. This effect is 
allowed for in the model, although the estimate is hardly significant. Cultural services are usually 
centrally located, but may serve sparsely populated surrounding areas as well, even outside the 
municipality. The latter effect emerges in the coefficient which shows that suburban municipalities 
have significantly lower expenditures on culture activities than otherwise similar non-suburban 
municipalities. The culture expenditures of suburban municipalities are estimated to fall below those 
of other municipalities by 150 NOK per capita. 
 Inverse population size and the dummy variable for small municipalities are included to 
account for economies of scale or centrality. The two variables are included to test for the possibility 
that diseconomies may either decline gradually or abruptly as a function of population. Significant 
scale economies show to be present in all services except social services and culture. Scale economies 
are particularly significant in the administration sector. Costs of urbanization are found to affect the 
social services. Social care expenditures of urban municipalities exceed those of other municipalities 
by 190 NOK per capita. 
 High requirements for sewage purification increase infrastructure expenditures significantly. A 
long an severe cold period in winter increases expenditures for administration, education, child care, 
health care, care for the elderly and disabled, culture and infrastructure. These effects arise from 
higher heating costs and infrastructure maintenance costs in cold periods. 
 In agreement with the hypothesis, minimum acceptable fiscal surplus depends significantly on 
changes in municipal income relative to the preceding year. The negative sign of the constant term of 
the minimum acceptable fiscal deficit suggests that local governments expect a positive long-term 
growth in exogenous income. Approximately 44 percent of the temporal change in exogenous income 
is used to improve the budget balance. 
 
Table 4.2. Estimates of subsistence expenditures, minimum budget surplus and maximum  user 
fees parameters a b 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Constant 
 
-0.41 
(1.89) 
-0.37 
(1.62) 
-0.77
(1.41) 
-0.68
(1.98) 
-1.06
(2.09) 
0.18 
(1.72) 
-0.34
(0.62) 
0.05 
(0.35) 
-0.26 
(0.49) 
1.62 
(6.75) 
Population share 0-6 years of 
age 
   8.17 
(3.19) 
5.52 
(1.58) 
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Population share 7-15 years 
of age 
  27.85
(8.53) 
       
Population share 80 years 
and above 
    7.95 
(2.28) 
     
Population share 67-89 years 
of age 
      14.27
(6.20) 
   
Population share 90 years 
and above 
      150.84
(4.88) 
   
Children 0-6 years with lone 
mother/father per capita 
   13.66
(1.70) 
      
Mentally disabled 7-15 years 
per capita 
  216.53
(2.33) 
       
Mentally disabled 16 years 
and above per capita 
      363.78
(22.03)
   
Unemployed 16-59 years per 
capita 
     12.78
(3.54) 
    
Divorced/separated 16-59 
years per capita 
     14.71
(6.21) 
    
Foreigners from remote 
cultures per capita 
     12.67
(3.82) 
    
Population density 
 
  -0.47
(2.12) 
 0.32 
(1.90) 
  0.15 
(1.69) 
  
Personhours (average 
traveling time) 
  1.19 
(5.97) 
 0.49 
(3.19) 
     
Population inverted 
(thousands) 
 1.08 
(6.08) 
    0.71 
(2.40) 
   
Dummy for small 
municipalities 
 0.22 
(2.45) 
0.57 
(4.65) 
0.28 
(3.29) 
0.31 
(3.85) 
   0.41 
(2.14) 
 
Dummy for urban 
municipalities 
     0.19 
(1.96) 
    
Dummy for suburban 
municipalities 
       -0.15 
(2.89) 
  
Sewage purification degree 
 
        0.51 
(3.14) 
 
Duration and severity of cold 
winter period 
 0.13 
(6.55) 
0.16 
(7.18) 
0.07 
(3.42) 
0.06 
(3.22) 
 0.10 
(2.53) 
0.07 
(6.41) 
0.18 
(3.80) 
 
Per capita change in 
municipal income 
0.44 
(8.51) 
         
Per capita exogenous income
excl. of min. exp. eq. 2 and 5 
         0.18 
(6.71) 
R2 adjusted 0.75 0.84 0.80 0.63 0.50 0.40 0.77 0.65 0.75 0.34 
 a The dependent variables are per capita operating result in equation 0, per capita expenditures in equation 1-8, and per 
capita fee income in equation 9. All pecuniary amounts are in thousands of Norwegian kroner. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
b The model equation numbers refer to 
Equation 0: Net operating result  Equation 5: Social services 
Equation 1: Administration   Equation 6: Care for the elderly and disabled 
Equation 2: Education   Equation 7: Culture 
Equation 3: Child care   Equation 8: Infrastructure 
Equation 4: Health care   Equation 9: Fee income 
 
Higher exogenous income is assumed to increase maximum acceptable fee income, because the local 
government can supply larger quantities without increasing user charges per unit. Thus, although user 
charges are reduced, the volume may increase and counteract this effect and lead to an increase in total 
fee income. The coefficient estimate is highly significant. An increase of 1.000 NOK in exogenous 
income induces an increase in maximum acceptable fee income by 180 NOK. 
 17
 Table 4.3 reports summary statistics for the distribution of estimated minimum required 
expenditures, minimum acceptable budget surplus and maximum acceptable user fees. Total 
subsistence expenditures for each municipality is equal to the sum of subsistence expenditures in the 8 
service sectors, and amounts on average to 17.850 NOK per capita. The variation across municipalities 
ranges from a minimum of 11.600 NOK per capita to a maximum of 25.310 NOK per capita. 
Education (4.780 NOK per capita on average) and care for the elderly and disabled (5.450 NOK per 
capita on average) emerge as the two sectors with highest mean subsistence expenditures. 
 
Table 4.3. Summary statistics of the distribution of estimated sector-specific subsistence 
 expenditures, minimum required fiscal surplus and maximum acceptable user fees. 
 1000 NOK 
 α0 α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 α6 α7 α8 κ α - 
α0 
α α + κ
Mean -0.32 1.46 4.78 1.13 0.92 1.16 5.45 0.84 2.11 4.36 17.85 17.52 21.88
Minimum -2.64 0.57 3.09 0.70 0.44 0.46 2.37 0.43 1.03 2.77 11.61 11.84 15.17
Maximum 2.05 5.66 7.41 2.44 1.86 2.34 12.17 1.45 3.86 14.51 25.31 25.15 36.37
St. dev. 0.43 0.58 0.70 0.24 0.25 0.32 1.40 0.19 0.56 1.25 2.81 2.81 3.65
 
Estimated subsistence expenditures prove to be positive in every service sector and each municipality. 
However, estimated minimum fiscal surplus take both negative and positive values. The constant term 
in the function for minimum acceptable fiscal surplus (shown in Table 4.2) is negative. This implies 
that a local government that faces no changes in exogenous income and have zero discretionary 
income will decide to have a deficit. Thus, the requirement of balanced budgets does not work as an 
effective binding constraint. Only 19 percent of the municipalities had minimum fiscal surpluses 
above zero. These municipalities faced income increases of at least 940 NOK per capita. 
 
Table 4.4. Subsistence expenditures as shares of total sector-specific expenditures. Per cent 
Expenditure 
sector 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 67.6 83.6 67.7 73.0 99.5 84.0 67.2 54.8 
 
In Norway local governments face minimum national standards in services like education, social 
services and care for elderly and disabled. Thus, we expect that the subsistence expenditure shares of 
total sector-specific expenditures of these sectors are larger than the corresponding shares of the 
remaining service sectors. The results of Table 4.4 confirm this hypothesis. There is considerable 
variation in estimated maximum acceptable fee income, which on average was 4.360 NOK per capita. 
The lowest and highest maximum acceptable user fees were 2.770 NOK and 14.510 NOK per capita, 
respectively. 
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 The model is consistent with utility maximization provided that spending levels exceed 
subsistence levels and user fees are below the maximum acceptable level. These constraints imply that 
discretionary income must be non-negative. Predictions for discretionary income are positive for all 
municipalities, except for one observation with a small negative value. Moreover, positive 
discretionary incomes means that there is scope for local government priorities across service sectors. 
4.2. Heterogeneity in marginal budget shares 
Table 4.5 gives the estimated coefficients of the marginal budget shares as specified in equation (3.3). 
The budget surplus, child care and culture expenditures, and fee income increase significantly with 
increasing private disposable income. User fees are the main instrument that local governments can use to 
reallocate resources from the private to the local public economy. Thus, the response of fees to private 
income changes can be interpreted as a conventional income effect. Municipalities with comparatively 
rich local residents also show to have a special preference for child care services, as reflected in the 
marginal budget shares. This is a plausible result, since rich parents tend to work more hours and demand 
more child care services. Higher production of child care may also bring about higher municipal fee 
income. Spending on culture services are also increasing with residential income, which is in line with 
the fact that people with higher incomes demand more culture services than people with lower incomes. 
 The higher the education level, the stronger are the local government preferences for child care 
services and culture services, and the weaker is the aversion against user charges. Authorities in well 
educated communities put lower priority on education and health care services. This effect might be 
due to omitted cost factors in the subsistence expenditures for education and health care. However, no 
such effect occurred when we controlled for the effect of the education level in the subsistence 
expenditures. Thus, we conclude that the education level is properly included as a taste variable. 
 The estimates show that socialist parties give priority to child care services, which is in line 
with the socialist program for public welfare and increased female participation in the labor force. The 
results also suggest that socialists tend to devote more resources to infrastructure services than non-
socialists. The infrastructure sector comprises different services like public water and sewage facilities, 
refuse disposal, public transportation, housing and industrial development. More detailed analysis is 
required to throw light on which parts of the sector are favored by socialists. Besides, socialists have a 
lower marginal propensity to save than non-socialists. Socialists also tend to collect more fee income, 
but this last effect is only slightly significant. 
 
Table 4.5. Estimates of marginal budget share parametersa b 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Constant 
 
-0.190 
(2.10) 
0.113 
(2.68) 
0.164
(2.10) 
-0.251
(4.36) 
0.125
(2.10) 
-0.012
(0.25) 
0.268
(2.44) 
-0.076 
(2.49) 
0.348 
(3.75) 
0.511
(6.27) 
Per capita private disposable 
income 
0.371 
(3.56) 
0.003 
(0.08) 
0.018
(0.22) 
0.236
(3.94) 
-0.044
(0.68) 
0.025
(0.43) 
-0.150
(1.30) 
0.063 
(2.06) 
-0.195 
(1.85) 
-0.326
(3.64) 
Average education level for 0.027 -0.007 -0.032 0.031 -0.028 0.002 -0.013 0.037 0.010 -0.027
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persons 30-59 years (1.56) (0.78) (2.22) (3.51) (2.40) (0.19) (0.60) (4.52) (0.60) (1.76) 
Share of socialists in 
municipal council 
-0.254 
(4.21) 
0.013 
(0.45) 
-0.015
(0.29) 
0.123
(4.51) 
-0.002
(0.05) 
-0.021
(0.84) 
0.072
(1.14) 
0.026 
(1.02) 
0.133 
(2.01) 
-0.076
(1.45) 
Herfindahl-index for party 
concentration 
0.170 
(1.88) 
-0.054 
(0.90) 
0.023
(0.28) 
0.002
(0.06) 
0.037
(0.49) 
-0.014
(0.31) 
-0.018
(0.16) 
-0.020 
(0.48) 
-0.074 
(0.73) 
-0.051
(0.54) 
R2 adjusted 0.75 0.84 0.80 0.63 0.50 0.40 0.77 0.65 0.75 0.34 
a The dependent variables are per capita operating result in equation 0, per capita expenditures in equation 1-8, and per capita 
fee income in equation 9. All pecuniary amounts are in thousands of Norwegian kroner, except for private disposable 
income, which is in hundreds of thousands. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
b The model equation numbers refer to 
Equation 0: Net operating result  Equation 5: Social services 
Equation 1: Administration   Equation 6: Care for the elderly and disabled 
Equation 2: Education   Equation 7: Culture 
Equation 3: Child care   Equation 8: Infrastructure 
Equation 4: Health care   Equation 9: Fee income 
 
The higher the party concentration in the municipal council, the higher is the marginal propensity to 
save. Thus, a strong political leadership has the opportunity to resist pressure for spending increases. 
The increase in budget surplus due to party concentration is mainly financed by reductions in 
administration and infrastructure expenditures, and by increased user charges. The results also show 
that the propensity to save increases with increasing private disposable income per capita. 
 Table 4.6 reports summary statistics for the estimated marginal budget shares. Marginal 
budget shares are defined as the proportions of a marginal increase in income that is distributed to the 
different service sectors. As suggested by equations (3.1) and (3.6) the income derivative for fees will 
not be equal to θ since exogenous income also affects κ, and κ depends on exogenous income. Thus, 
the derivative for fees with respect to exogenous income is reported in the second column of Table 
4.6, assuming that minimum saving is kept constant. The marginal budget share for the fiscal surplus 
is defined as the proportion of the increase in total income (including fees) that is saved for future 
spending. The marginal budget shares for the service sectors are standardized such that the shares of 
the eight service sectors add up to one, which means that we report the marginal expenditure shares. 
 The model is consistent with utility maximization provided that the estimated θ's and marginal 
budget shares are non-negative. The estimated θ's and marginal budget shares are positive for most 
observations. There are a few negative predictions for θ and the marginal budget shares in health care 
and social services, but these are statistically insignificant. The derivative of fees with respect to 
exogenous income is positive for 89 percent of the municipalities. For fee income, this means that 
positive volume effects are dominating over price reductions in response to a wider economic choice 
set. 
 
Table 4.6. Summary statistics of the distribution of estimated sector-specific marginal budget 
 shares 
 θ ∂
∂
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y
 β
θ
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θ β
1
01 − −
 
β
θ β
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θ β
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β
θ β
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β
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β
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β
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β
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Mean 0.117 0.043 0.168 0.123 0.162 0.099 0.056 0.001 0.179 0.076 0.304
Minimum -0.043 -0.043 0.062 0.089 0.099 0.000 -0.031 -0.014 0.066 0.031 0.211
Maximum 0.190 0.233 0.412 0.148 0.247 0.300 0.113 0.022 0.216 0.203 0.338
Standard 
deviation 
 
0.035 0.042
 
0.047 0.010 0.018 0.042 0.017 0.006
 
0.019 
 
0.022 
 
   0.017 
 
Local governments will on average use 17 percent of a marginal income increase to improve the fiscal 
balance. We observe particularly high marginal expenditure budget shares in infrastructure services. 
Marginal budget shares for fiscal surplus and child care services and the derivatives of fees with 
respect to exogenous income show to vary considerably between municipalities. By contrast, the 
marginal budget shares for administration, education, health care and infrastructure vary modestly, 
whilst the marginal budget shares for social services are extremely small for all municipalities. 
 The estimated effect on fees from an increase in private disposable income of 100 NOK is 3 
NOK on average. This is a rather low figure both in an international context and compared to the 
effect of intergovernmental grants. As shown in Table 4.6, the impact of grant money on fee income is 
on average positive and will in fact induce reductions in private consumption in most municipalities. 
This result owes to the fact that increased volume of local public services dominates over the tendency 
to reduce user charges in response to increased municipal income. As a consequence, the flypaper 
effects reported in this paper are extraordinary strong. 
5. Disparities of income and price elasticities 
The expressions for Engel, Cournot and Slutsky elasticities are given in Appendix B. The Engel 
elasticities are obtained under the assumption that minimum fiscal surplus is unaffected by the income 
change. The endogenous variables that enter into the formulas are replaced by predicted values. Since 
we have allowed for heterogeneity in subsistence levels and marginal budget shares it is of interest to 
examine how heterogeneity in production costs and local tastes affect the various price and income 
elasticities. Table 5.1 reports mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviations of income 
elasticities and direct price elasticities. Fiscal surplus elasticities are not included in Table 5.1 since 
fiscal surplus may be equal to zero. 
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Table 5.1. Summary statistics of income and price elasticities 
Equation number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Engel elasticities 
Mean 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Standard deviation 
 
1.09 
0.51 
1.60 
0.17 
 
0.51 
0.29 
0.79 
0.09 
1.05
0.01
2.04
0.33
0.82
-0.90
1.81
0.24
0.01
-0.42
0.38
0.12
0.50
0.25
0.83
0.09
 
1.09 
0.60 
2.00 
0.20 
 
1.47 
0.98 
2.04 
0.17 
0.24
-0.50
0.99
0.22
Direct  
Cournot elasticities 
Mean 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Standard deviation 
 
 
-0.36 
-0.76 
-0.09 
0.11 
 
 
-0.25 
-0.66 
-0.12 
0.08 
-0.34
-0.80
0.00
0.14
-0.27
-0.82
0.37
0.13
0.00
-0.28
0.17
0.05
-0.26
-0.63
-0.10
0.08
 
 
-0.34 
-0.85 
-0.05 
0.13 
 
 
-0.54 
-0.90 
-0.22 
0.13 
Direct 
Slutsky elasticities 
Mean 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Standard deviation 
 
 
-0.26 
-0.66 
0.02 
0.11 
 
 
-0.11 
-0.52 
0.02 
0.08 
-0.25
-0.70
0.02
0.13
-0.22
-0.76
0.35
0.13
0.00
-0.27
0.16
0.04
-0.11
-0.49
0.03
0.07
 
 
-0.28 
-0.80 
0.01 
0.13 
 
 
-0.28 
-0.67 
0.05 
0.13 
 
The income elasticities turn out to be positive, except for a few municipalities with negative 
elasticities in health care and social services. For social services, all variation is captured by 
unobservables since the estimates in column five of Table 4.5 are insignificant. Hence, the results are 
consistent with the assumption of normal goods with the modification that the fee income response is 
ambiguous due to the income effect on maximum fees. Infrastructure is a service sector in which 
almost all municipalities have income elastic demand. For child care, administration and cultural 
services Engel elasticities are on average larger than one. For health care, some municipalities have 
income-elastic demand, but on average the demand is income-inelastic. Education, care for the elderly 
and disabled, and social services are income-inelastic for all municipalities. The Engel elasticity for 
fee income is within the range of -0.50 and 0.99, with a mean of 0.24. 
 Apart from the municipalities with negative income elasticities in social services and health 
care, all direct Cournot elasticities are negative. All goods are price-inelastic, with a Cournot elasticity 
below one in absolute value. In resemblance with the results for Engel elasticities, the Slutsky 
elasticities are particularly small in social services, education, and care for the elderly and disabled. 
This may be due to the fact that these service sectors to a greater extent than the remaining sectors are 
subject to requirements and regulations from the central government. Thus, when these requirements 
are met the local governments give priority to spending in infrastructure, administration, child care and 
culture. Note that the subsistence expenditures of education, care for the elderly and social services 
accounted for 83.6, 84.0 and 99.5 per cent of the corresponding total sector-specific expenditures in 
1993. 
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 Since income and price elasticities depend on municipal income, the pattern of variation with 
respect to income may provide essential information. Table 5.2 displays mean elasticities by deciles of 
total municipal income. The results for deciles 3-8 vary only slightly and are reported by their mean 
value. The mean per capita income in the two lowest, the middle and two highest decile groups are 
found to be equal to 16.990, 18.490, 22.910, 30.600, and 40.670 NOK, respectively. 
 Table 5.2 shows that the Engel elasticities for education and care for the elderly and disabled 
increase with per capita income, whilst the Engel elasticities for administration, child care, culture and 
infrastructure decrease as a function of income. Hence, Engel elasticities tend to increase with income 
for income-inelastic services and decrease with income for income-elastic services. The largest 
variation in income elasticities across service sectors is found for municipalities with low per capita 
income. 
 
Table 5.2. Income and price elasticities by deciles of total income 
Sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Engel elasticities 
Decile 1 
Decile 2 
Decile 3-8 
Decile 9 
Decile 10 
 
1.24 
1.22 
1.10 
0.92 
0.90 
 
0.42 
0.44 
0.50 
0.58 
0.66 
1.19
1.18
1.03
0.95
0.98
0.81
0.74
0.81
0.88
0.93
0.03
0.04
0.01
-0.05
-0.03
0.49
0.46
0.49
0.57
0.61
 
1.14 
1.20 
1.09 
0.99 
1.02 
 
1.50 
1.50 
1.50 
1.40 
1.34 
0.31
0.30
0.22
0.19
0.27
Direct 
Cournot elasticities 
Decile 1 
Decile 2 
Decile 3-8 
Decile 9 
Decile 10 
 
 
-0.30 
-0.32 
-0.35 
-0.40 
-0.50 
 
 
-0.18 
-0.19 
-0.23 
-0.32 
-0.42 
-0.27
-0.30
-0.32
-0.40
-0.52
-0.17
-0.18
-0.24
-0.36
-0.50
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
0.02
0.01
-0.20
-0.21
-0.24
-0.32
-0.40
 
 
-0.26 
-0.29 
-0.33 
-0.40 
-0.54 
 
 
-0.43 
-0.46 
-0.53 
-0.64 
-0.74 
Direct  
Slutsky elasticities 
Decile 1 
Decile 2 
Decile 3-8 
Decile 9 
Decile 10 
 
 
-0.19 
-0.22 
-0.25 
-0.30 
-0.40 
 
 
-0.04 
-0.06 
-0.09 
-0.17 
-0.27 
-0.16
-0.20
-0.23
-0.32
-0.44
-0.13
-0.14
-0.19
-0.31
-0.44
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
0.02
0.00
-0.06
-0.06
-0.09
-0.16
-0.24
 
 
-0.18 
-0.22 
-0.26 
-0.35 
-0.48 
 
 
-0.18 
-0.20 
-0.26 
-0.36 
-0.48 
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Table 5.3. Mean values of own and cross Cournot elasticities 
Sector           1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9 
Price 1 -0.36 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 0.05
Price 2 -0.22 -0.25 -0.21 -0.17 0.00 -0.10 -0.22 -0.30 -0.06
Price 3 -0.05 -0.02 -0.34 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 0.04
Price 4 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.27 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.03
Price 5 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.02
Price 6 -0.25 -0.12 -0.24 -0.19 0.00 -0.26 -0.25 -0.34 0.20
Price 7 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.34 -0.05 0.03
Price 8 -0.10 -0.04 -0.10 -0.07 0.00 -0.04 -0.10 -0.54 0.07
 
Cross-price elasticities are reported in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. In general, Slutsky cross-price elasticities 
are positive and rather small. This substitutability property is implied by the ELES model. Cournot 
cross-price elasticities are in general negative and dominating over the positive substitution effect. 
However, the Cournot cross price elasticities for fee income are positive, except for price increases in 
education and social services. The remaining sectors differ from education and social services since 
increased unit costs affect fees only through the reduction in discretionary income. The cross-price 
effects of education and social services on fees are ambiguous because increased subsistence 
expenditures for those sectors also reduce maximum acceptable fees. This is reflected by the computed 
elasticities, which take both positive and negative signs. 
 
Table 5.4. Mean values of own and cross Slutsky elasticities 
           1           2           3           4           5           6           7           8           9 
Price 1 -0.26 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07
Price 2 0.08 -0.11 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.01
Price 3 0.04 0.02 -0.25 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06
Price 4 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.22 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05
Price 5 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
Price 6 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.00 -0.11 0.09 0.13 0.27
Price 7 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.28 0.04 0.04
Price 8 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.10 -0.28 0.12
 
6. Out-of-sample predictions 
Although the estimated model parameters are found to be consistent with our theoretical framework it 
is important to examine how the model performs with respect to prediction. In this section the 
empirical model that was estimated on data for 1993 is used to predict the fiscal and spending behavior 
of local governments in 1994, and thus will demonstrate to what extent the model is able to predict 
local government behavior in an environment that differs from the one which was at the bottom of the 
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estimation. For the sake of comparability the observed accounting data for 1994 were deflated to 1993 
prices. The price index for local government consumption in the National Accounts of Norway was 
used as deflator. The prediction results reported in Table 6.1 show that the model is able to predict 
aggregate behavior quite well. 
 The relative mean prediction error in the third row is the difference between the first and the 
second row divided by the figures in the first row. The relative mean prediction error is quite small for 
most of the service sectors which suggests that there is little evidence of systematic over- or under-
prediction by the model. The largest relative mean prediction errors are found for the fiscal surplus 
and the health care expenditures. 
 
Table 6.1. Actual and predicted means of endogenous variables for 1994. 1000 NOK per capita1 
Equation number 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mean actual 1.52  2.16  5.75 1.78  1.14  1.15 6.82  1.26  4.05 3.61 
Mean predicted 1.27  2.25  5.81 1.73  1.30  1.16 6.63  1.32  4.03 3.51 
Relative mean error 0.16 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.14 -0.01 0.03 -0.05  0.00 0.03 
Simulated R2 adjusted 0.72  0.85  0.78 0.62  0.36  0.37 0.80  0.63  0.74 0.30 
1 The sample for 1994 consists of 429 municipalities.  Out of a total of 435 municipalities, one municipality was 
left out because of missing data, and five since they were considered to be outliers. 
 
The estimated R2 displayed in Tables 4.5 and 6.1 show that the performance is almost as good as the 
model’s ability to reproduce the 1993 observations. The overall impression from the out-of sample 
predictions is that the model simulates local government allocations rather well. 
7. Summary and conclusion 
This paper focuses on the problem of formulating and estimating a structural model of fiscal and 
spending behavior of local governments when data of prices are absent. The econometric analysis, 
which is based on detailed local government accounts for Norwegian municipalities in 1993, 
recognizes total spending as well as total income as endogenous variables. We present estimates for 
eight service sectors based on a modified version of the extended linear expenditure system (ELES). 
As opposed to the standard ELES our ELES version allows the present value of changes in future 
exogenous incomes to differ from zero. This property justifies the presence of budget deficits among 
local governments. 
 Our data do not include information on prices. However, by using municipality characteristics 
to account for heterogeneity in the marginal budget share parameters, we achieve identification of the 
complete demand system. This means that we may assess price elasticities even though we have no 
direct information on prices. Moreover, allowing for heterogeneity in the parameters of the demand 
system makes the Engel curves more flexible, and thus to a certain extent accommodate the 
conventional criticism against the LES and the ELES. 
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 Although the ELES allows for identification of minimum required expenditure on various 
public services the interpretation of the subsistence expenditures requires some caution. This is largely 
due to the fact that the assessment of minimum standards on various services is considered to be a 
normative question which means that people have different views on what is required to be the sector-
specific minimum standards and expenditures. However, even though there may be conflicting views 
about the levels of the subsistence expenditures the estimated ELES may nevertheless provide an 
adequate description of the variation in (relative) subsistence expenditure across municipalities. 
 Due to observed heterogeneity in local tastes and production costs the paper provides a 
detailed analysis of the expenditure effects of various community variables and of the spending 
responses from increases in exogenous income and prices.  
 Expenditures on national welfare services as education, social services and care for the elderly 
and disabled prove to be only weakly sensitive to changes in the economic conditions of the 
municipalities. When the quality of these services is ensured to be in line with the requirements of the 
central government, it seems that the local governments give priority to spending in infrastructure, 
administration, child care and culture. The impact of grants-in-aid on fees is on average positive and 
will induce a reduction in private consumption for the majority of the municipalities. This result owes 
to the volume increase in local public services as a response to increased exogenous income. 
 In order to examine how the 1993-based model performs with respect to prediction, we 
simulated the fiscal and spending behavior of local governments in 1994. The results of these out-of-
sample predictions show that the model predicts local governments behavior quite well. 
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Appendix A 
Data 
1. Data from the local government accounts 
Observations of the endogenous model variables are provided by the local government accounts 
reported for the year 1993. The administration sector in the model solely contains central 
administration, while sector administration is included in the service sectors. Expenditures are defined 
to include net transfers to municipalities, counties and others. Exogenous income consists of tax 
income and net transfers from the central government. The operating result equals current income plus 
user fees minus current expenditures minus net interest and installment payments. 
2. Data from other sources 
The Norwegian population register along with the 1990 Census provide observations of the following 
dempographic and municipality variables: 
• Total population 
• Dummy for small municipalities with less than 5 000 inhabitants 
• Population data by age group 
• Foreign citizens with remote cultural background (These include citizens of African, Asiatic and 
Latin-American countries and also Turkey) 
• Persons that are divorced or separated 
• Children with a single supporter 
• Personhours - residents average traveling time to the center of the municipality 
• Population density - share of population living in densely populated areas 
• Dummy for urban municipalities containing a center with more than 15 000 inhabitants 
• Dummy for suburban municipalities that are not themselves urban, but are near to an urban center 
measured in traveling time 
 The number of mentally disabled by age groups was obtained from the Ministry of Health and 
Social Affairs. 
 The number of unemployed persons was defined equal to the number registered by the 
Directorate of Labour.   
 The purification degree is the share of total sewage disposal capacity that utilizes an intensive 
purification process. The data are collected by Statistics Norway at the plant level. To construct data at 
the municipality level we had to divide the capacity in joint sewage plants, where the shares of persons 
connected to the plant in different jurisdictions were used as weights. 
 The information on cold winter periods was delivered by the Norwegian Meteorological 
Institute. The cold variable is measured as the average number of degrees below 17 degrees of Celcius 
 29
per day through the whole year, recording every day with a temperature above 17 degrees as an 
observation of zero. 
 Private disposable income is derived from the Income register of Statistics Norway. We use 
the definition in the register, except that debt interest payments are not subtracted, whilst municipal 
social security benefits are subtracted. 
 The local education level is defined as the average number of years beyond the compulsory 9 
years in primary school accomplished by residents in the age group 30-59 years. The source is the 
official register of highest completed educations. 
 The share of socialist representatives in the local government council was derived from the 
official election statistics. The Norwegian Labour Party and all parties to its left are defined as socialist 
parties. The Herfindahl-index for party concentration in the local government council was derived 
from the same source. Let Sj be the share of representatives from party j in the local council.  Then the 
Herfindal-index is defined as 
  H Sj
j
P
=
=
 2
1
where P is the number of parties. The index takes its maximum value of 1 when a single party holds all 
seats in the local council, while the minimum value of 1/P is attained when the seats are equally 
divided among the P parties. 
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Appendix B 
Formulas for computation of elasticities 
The parameters αi, βi, θ and κ are computed as defined in equations (3.2), (3.3), (3.5) and (3.6). The 
heterogeneity vectors z and t are given in Tables 4.1 and 4.4. The endogenous variables that enter into 
the formulas are replaced by predicted values in the computation. 
1. Engel elasticities 
(B.1)  
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β κlog
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3. Slutsky elasticities 
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Appendix C 
An extended version of the empirical model 
The empirical model reported in Section 4 includes a large set of community characteristics that are 
assumed to capture the essential features of heterogeneity in production costs, minimum budget 
surplus, maximum user fees, and tastes across municipalities. Our preferred model is reported in 
Tables 4.2 and 4.5.  A more general model specification is reported in tables D.1 and D.2. In Table 
D.1, we include all the hypothesized effects on subsistence expenditures that have been excluded in 
Table 4.2, due to insignificant parameter estimates. 
 Table D.1 also includes one variable that is excluded in Table 4.2.  The number of mentally 
children 0-6 years have no significant effect on expenditures, neither in child care, health care, nor 
care for the elderly and disabled.  Furthermore, there is no evidence that health care expenditures are 
affected by the number of mentally retarded youth and adults.  Expenditures in care for the elderly and 
disabled are not affected significantly by the number of mentally retarded children and youth. 
 The effect of unemployment on health care expenditures is insignificant.  The same applies to 
the effect of foreigners from remote cultures on school expenditures.  This effect was assumed to 
capture needs for special lessons. 
 The effects of scale economics or centrality were tested in all service sectors using the inverted 
population and the dummy for small municipalities.  The estimates of the coefficients are reported in 
Table D.1. 
 Urban municipalities are expected to have lower education expenditures and higher health care 
and culture expenditures than other municipalities.  Low education expenditures could arise because 
average traveling time to the municipal center capture costs of decentralization that do not apply to 
large cities.  Higher frequencies of illness or more supply-generated demand in cities may bring about 
higher health care expenditures.  Higher culture expenditures in cities may derive from municipal 
liabilities as a regional center.  However, none of these hypotheses were confirmed in the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table D.1. Estimates of subsistence expenditures, minimum budget surplus and maximum 
       user fees parametersa b 
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 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Constant 
 
-0.41 
(1.80) 
-0.38 
(1.59) 
-0.60
(1.02) 
-0.69
(1.89) 
-1.14
(1.77) 
0.29 
(2.25) 
-0.27
(0.42) 
-0.02 
(0.11) 
-0.31 
(0.55) 
1.75 
(7.67) 
Population share 0-6 years of 
age 
   8.02 
(2.98) 
5.86 
(1.62) 
     
Population share 7-15 years 
of age 
  26.17
(7.75) 
       
Population share 80 years 
and above 
    8.15 
(1.89) 
     
Population share 67-89 years 
of age 
      14.42
(5.44) 
   
Population share 90 years 
and above 
      147.15
(4.45) 
   
Children 0-6 years with lone 
mother/father per capita 
   13.08
(1.50) 
      
Mentally retarded 0-6 years 
per capita 
   54.46
(0.58) 
-172.5
(1.25) 
 85.37
(0.32) 
   
Mentally retarded 7-15 years 
per capita 
  207.47
(2.11) 
 -38.38
(0.40) 
 -52.97
(0.30) 
   
Mentally retarded 16 years 
and above per capita 
    7.58 
(0.44) 
 360.05
(14.73)
   
Unemployed 16-59 years per 
capita 
    1.71 
(0.25) 
11.11
(2.79) 
    
Divorced/separated 16-59 
years per capita 
     13.99
(5.64) 
    
Foreigners from remote 
cultures per capita 
  -3.71
(0.43) 
  11.62
(3.24) 
    
Population density   -0.27
(1.12) 
 0.41 
(2.16) 
  0.15 
(1.35) 
  
Personhours (average 
traveling time) 
  1.26 
(5.37) 
 0.65 
(3.69) 
 -0.51
(1.26) 
   
Population inverted 
(thousands) 
 1.16 
(6.43) 
0.32 
(0.99) 
-0.03
(0.18) 
0.32 
(1.49) 
-0.15
(1.02) 
0.66 
(1.66) 
-0.03 
(0.20) 
0.18 
(0.42) 
 
Dummy for small 
municipalities 
 0.22 
(2.03) 
0.56 
(3.28) 
0.31 
(2.70) 
0.26 
(2.58) 
-0.04
(0.70) 
0.16 
(0.61) 
0.05 
(0.52) 
0.43 
(1.62) 
 
Dummy for urban 
municipalities 
  -0.24
(0.78) 
 -0.09
(0.36) 
0.22 
(1.89) 
 0.11 
(0.93) 
  
Dummy for suburban 
municipalities 
       -0.12 
(2.15) 
  
Sewage purification degree         0.49 
(2.88) 
 
Duration and severity of cold 
winter period 
 0.13 
(6.17) 
0.16 
(6.68) 
0.07 
(3.19) 
0.06 
(2.99) 
 0.10 
(2.19) 
0.08 
(5.82) 
0.18 
(3.64) 
 
Per capita change in 
municipal income 
0.44 
(8.19) 
         
Per capita municipal income 
excl. of min. exp. eq. 2 and 5 
         0.16 
(6.25) 
R2 adjusted 0.75 0.84 0.80 0.63 0.52 0.40 0.77 0.65 0.75 0.34 
a The dependent variables are per capita budget surplus in equation 0, per capita expenditures in equation 1-8, and per capita 
fee income in equation 9. All pecuniary amounts are in thousands of Norwegian kroner. T-statistics are in parantheses. 
n=426. 
b The model equation numbers refer to 
Equation 0: Budget surplus   Equation 5: Social services 
Equation 1: Administration   Equation 6: Care for the elderly and disabled 
Equation 2: Education   Equation 7: Culture 
Equation 3: Child care   Equation 8: Infrastructure 
Equation 4: Health care   Equation 9: Fee income 
Table D.2. Estimates of marginal budget share parametersa b 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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 34
Constant -0.189 
- 
0.114 
(2.24) 
0.149 
(1.70) 
-0.266
(4.11) 
0.095 
(1.28) 
-0.014
(0.24) 
0.299 
(2.16) 
-0.069 
(1.93) 
0.341 
(3.10) 
0.512 
(5.89) 
Per capita private disposable 
income 
0.386 
- 
0.006 
(0.12) 
0.018 
(0.19) 
0.252 
(3.87) 
-0.037
(0.46) 
0.014 
 (0.21) 
-0.172
(1.17) 
0.059 
(1.66) 
-0.193 
(1.63) 
-0.332
 (3.21) 
Average education level for 
persons 30-59 years 
0.023 
- 
-0.007 
(0.71) 
-0.024
(1.39) 
0.032 
(3.07) 
-0.018
(1.17) 
0.005 
(0.41) 
-0.018
(0.71) 
0.037 
(3.77) 
0.013 
(0.59) 
-0.030
(1.56) 
Share of socialists in 
municipal council 
-0.261 
- 
0.014 
(0.43) 
-0.017
(0.31) 
0.129 
(4.01) 
-0.001
(0.02) 
-0.019
(0.74) 
0.074 
(0.91) 
0.025 
(0.88) 
0.141 
(1.72) 
-0.085
(1.52) 
Herfindahl-index for party 
concentration 
0.183 
- 
-0.057 
(0.86) 
0.012 
(0.11) 
0.005 
(0.12) 
0.027 
(0.32) 
-0.008
(0.16) 
-0.014
(0.10) 
-0.019 
(0.41) 
-0.077 
(0.61) 
-0.052
(0.52) 
R2 adjusted 0.75 0.84 0.80 0.63 0.52 0.40 0.77 0.65 0.75 0.34 
a The dependent variables are per capita budget surplus in equation 0, per capita expenditures in equation 1-8, and per capita 
fee income in equation 9. All pecuniary amounts are in thousands of Norwegian kroner, except for private disposable 
income, which is in hundreds of thousands. T-statistics are in parantheses. n=426. 
b The model equation numbers refer to 
Equation 0: Budget surplus   Equation 5: Social services 
Equation 1: Administration   Equation 6: Care for the elderly and disabled 
Equation 2: Education    Equation 7: Culture 
Equation 3: Child care    Equation 8: Infrastructure 
Equation 4: Health care    Equation 9: Fee income 
 
 
